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Global Economic Integration in Developing Countries: The Role
of Corruption and Human Capital Investment
Charles E. Bryant • Rajshekhar G. Javalgi
Abstract Globalization is multifaceted and involves the
interaction among businesses, services, governments, and
societies beyond national borders. As a result, the flow of
foreign direct investment (FDI), international trade in
goods and services, and the economic interdependence of
the nations of the world have been increasing. At the same
time, much attention has been paid to the effect of cor-
ruption prevalent within many cultures and societies, and
its impact on the economies, especially developing econ-
omies. This paper examines the relationship between
human capital investment, the level of national corruption,
and the global economic integration (GEI) of a nation in
developing countries. Based on the data collected from
over 60 countries, and building on the FDI and human
capital theories, it was found that human capital investment
and corruption are related to GEI. It was also found that the
level of corruption moderates the relationship between
human capital investment and GEI of developing econo-
mies. The findings of the study can help to deepen our
understanding of GEI and have practical implications for
developing countries in terms developing human capital,
which plays a critical role in today’s knowledge-based
economy.
Keywords Corruption  Foreign direct investment 
International trade  Global economic integration  Human
capital investment
Introduction
Globalization is arguably the most popular concept used to
describe the economic interconnectedness of nations
around the world. It occurs at multiple levels and thus must
be conceptualized and defined at each level. A review of
the extant literature on globalization reveals three units of
analysis that have been researched: Firm level, industry
level, and national level (Akhter 2004). At the firm level,
globalization is seen as the ‘‘process through which firm’s
move toward integrated network structures’’ (Malnight
1995). At this level, the degree of globalization is usually
referred to in terms of a financial measure such as foreign
sales to total sales. At the industry level, Porter defined
globalization as ‘‘a series of linked domestic industries in
which rivals compete against each other on a truly world-
wide basis’’ (Porter 1986). As an example, Morrison and
Roth (1992) used measures such as level of international
trade, worldwide product standardization, and the presence
of key competitors in all key global markets, as measures
of industry level globalization.
At the national level, globalization incorporates polit-
ical, social, and economic interactions (Holm and
Sorenson 1995). Harris (1993) defined national level
globalization as ‘‘the increasing internationalization of the
production, distribution, and marketing of goods and
services’’. Akhter (2004) conceptualized economic glob-
alization as ‘‘a process that results in increasing integra-
tion of a country’s economy with the rest of the world’’.
Economic globalization comprises the globalization of
markets, production, technology, industries, and corpora-
tions. Developed countries are integrating with developing
countries by means of foreign direct investment (FDI),
reduction in trade barriers, and changes in political
landscape.
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While the economic, social and political impacts of
globalization have been argued extensively in both the
literature and by governmental commissions (Calomiris
2000; Holm and Sorenson 1995; Meltzer 2000; Mikesell
2001; Sachs 2000; Sorensen 2002; Weitho¨ner 2006), and
even protested at the Word Trade Organization (WTO)
meetings, there is substantial research indicating the posi-
tive benefits of being economically integrated. Recent
research on the benefits for nation states becoming more
globally connected indicates positive economic benefits
both the host and home economies. (Akhter 2004; Akinola
2012; Chang and Lee 2011).
According to the extant literature, the two primary fac-
tors impacting economic interconnectedness of a nation
are: (1) FDI, (2) international trade (Akhter 2004; Rugman
and Verbeke 2004; Rugman 2001). We build on this con-
cept by defining global economic integration (GEI) of a
nation as a multidimensional construct comprised interna-
tional trade (as measured by the exports of goods and
services) and foreign direct investment (as measured by
inward FDI). It is the national level of GEI with which this
present work is concerned.
One of the challenges facing national leaders and policy
makers, especially in developing countries, is to increase
the level of GEI of their economies by increasing inter-
national trade and FDI inflows. Due to liberalization and
globalization, a country’s economy is much more associ-
ated with such country specific factors as investment in
human capital and corruption. A nation’s, especially a
developing nation, integration into the global economy
largely depends on its sustained economic growth, which is
inextricably connected to such internal factors as human
capital development and the level of corruption.
Thus, motivated by the above-mentioned issues, con-
ducting a study on the effects of human capital investment
and corruption on the GEI of a nation is of great signifi-
cance in this globalized era. However, there is a lack of
research on the relationships among investment in human
capital, national level corruption, and the GEI of a nation.
This paper attempts to close that gap.
This paper offers an empirical investigation of the
impact of human capital investment and corruption on the
GEI of a nation. More specifically, our primary objectives
in this paper are (1) to provide evidence that investment in
human capital has a positive impact on GEI, (2) to provide
evidence that corruption negatively impacts GEI, and (3) to
provide evidence that national level corruption moderates
the relationship between human capital investment and
GEI.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
first section provides the foundational theories on which we
build our conceptual argument regarding the relationships
among human capital investment, corruption, and GEI. The
second section presents literature review and hypothesis
development. The third section details the methodology
used in hypotheses testing and discusses the overall results.
The final section provides a conclusion and offers insight
into the implications of this research.
Theoretical Underpinnings
This current research focuses on the interrelationships
between GEI, corruption, and human capital investment.
We define GEI as a multidimensional construct consisting
of two factors: inward FDI and international trade. As such,
the theories underlying our GEI construct are based in FDI
theory and international trade theory. These theories, along
with human capital theory, provide the foundation for this
research and are the focus of this section.
FDI Theory
Much of the theoretical work in the field of FDI stems from
the economics foundation laid by Coase (1937) and Bain
(1956). A primary research for establishing the field was
Hymer’s (1976) work, in which he fundamentally changed
the focus of international investment away from neo-clas-
sical economics, which assumed the motivation for inter-
national investment to be interest rate differentials, and
toward the multinational enterprise (MNE) as the founda-
tion for FDI (Dunning and Rugman 1985).
For the purpose of this work, we are interested in the
motivations for FDI as would be required to better under-
stand GEI of a nation. Thus, we will rely primarily on the
work by Dunning (1980, 1988, 1993). Dunning’s Eclectic
Paradigm (commonly referred to as the OLI paradigm) for
International Involvement, emphasizes three components
for FDI motivation: ownership advantage (O), location
advantage (L), and internalization advantage (I). Dunning
(1980) states that ownership advantages come in the form
of both physical advantages such as technological, as well
as intangible advantages such as knowledge management.
He also incorporated into his ownership advantages, ben-
efits he termed ‘‘Transaction Cost Advantages’’—advan-
tages that accrue to an MNE through the process of being
international—such as knowledge of global markets and
the benefits of risk-diversification (Dunning 1993). The
locational (or country specific) advantages are linked to the
‘‘endowments specific to the countries in which they
operate’’ (Dunning 1980). These location specific endow-
ments, which are categorized into three groups (economic,
political, and social), provide comparative advantages due
to the host country’s specific characteristics. MNE’s gain
these location specific endowments when they acquire
ownership in specific countries. Internalization (I) provides
the final leg of the OLI paradigm in which, Dunning (1980)
answers the question of ‘‘why’’ an MNE would elect to use
its ownership advantages instead of selling or leasing these
to a firm in the local market. MNE’s will internalize pro-
duction rather than externalize it when market imperfec-
tions create an opportunity, which the MNE can exploit by
utilizing its own internal resources. These market imper-
fections can include uncertainty regarding price and
availability of supplies, as well as high costs of enforcing
property rights.
The OLI paradigm seeks to connect ownership and
internalization theories with location advantage, using the
idea that once an MNE decided to internalize certain
ownership advantages, the MNE needed to decide on the
location of that process. This decision is influenced by the
natural endowments of the country, but also by the insti-
tutional, legal, political, and cultural environments (Dun-
ning 1993). In light of this, Voyer and Beamish (2004) note
that the trust and commitment that are necessary for
building international operations are compromised in the
presence of corruption As such they extend the utility of
the OLI paradigm by introducing the notion of corruption
and its influence on FDI. Further, Boddewyn (1988) notes
that an MNE can reduce the uncertainty associated with
foreign operations by better understanding the issue of
corruption. Habib and Zurawicki (2002), identify corrup-
tion as exerting a strong influence on inward FDI—thus
impacting the locational decision (L).
The relationship between corruption and FDI has been
well documented in the literature (Al-Sadig 2009; Habib
and Zurawicki 2002; Mauro 1996, 1997; Peng and
Beamish 2008; Voyer and Beamish 2004). To understand
the impact that corruption has on FDI, we must first
understand corruption. Researchers agree that corruption
has many definitions and can be viewed differently
depending on the context. Transparency International (TI)
summarizes the economic impact of corruption as: ‘‘Cor-
ruption constitutes a major obstacle to democracy and the
rule of law … Accountable political leadership cannot
develop in a corrupt climate … Corruption leads to the
depletion of national wealth … Furthermore, it hinders the
development of fair market structures and distorts com-
petition, thereby deterring investment (Transparency-
International 2010). For the purpose of this study, we look
at corruption in the public sector and use the following
definition from TI as the basis for our work. ‘‘Corruption is
operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain. TI further differentiates between ‘‘according
to rule’’ corruption and ‘‘against the rule’’ corruption.
Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive
preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver
is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter,
on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the
bribe receiver is prohibited from providing’’ (Transpar-
ency-International 2010).
In order to attract FDI, a country must have an invest-
ment climate (including licensing systems, infrastructure,
and tax systems) that is conducive to foreign investors.
Investors often judge the desirability of a developing
investment climate through the level of perceived corrup-
tion in the government (Mauro 1997). Thus, the perceived
level of corruption has a dramatic impact on foreign
investment. Corruption is like a two edged sword: it
reduces the level of investment and thus economic growth.
Another theory that is relevant to the current article is
international trade theory, which is presented below.
International Trade Theory
Tracing back the evolution of what today is recognized as
the standard theory of free trade takes us back to the years
between 1776 and 1826, which respectively mark the
publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and David
Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy. Free trade, as
opposed to the mercantilist policies of protection, was
championed at the theoretical level, by both Smith and
Ricardo as a route to achieve production efficiency at a
global level. In the decades that followed, scholars pursued
both theoretical and empirical work to better understand
the impact of trade on a nation’s economy.
By the early 1980s, the classical models of free trade
were debated from different quarters. The major efforts to
restructure the free trade doctrine were made in the new
trade theory literature. The key contribution of the new
trade theory was to discard the limiting assumptions of the
traditional trade theory: the absence of scale economies in
production, and the assumptions of homogeneous products
and perfectly competitive markets in exchange. These three
aspects—scale economies, imperfect markets, and product
differentiation—which differentiate the new trade theory
from the old trade models, effectively challenge the
capacity of the old models as a predictor of the trade pat-
tern across nations on the basis of pre-trade commodity and
factor prices as determined by relative endowments. The
introduction of returns to scale, which was a major
departure of the new trade theory, influenced both the
predictability of trade patterns as well as the benefits from
trade to the trading countries. The issues of international
trade and economic growth have gained substantial
importance with the introduction of trade liberalization
policies in the developing nations across the world. Inter-
national trade and its impact on economic growth crucially
depend on globalization.
In sum, while international trade has been present
throughout much of history, its economic, social, and
political importance has become more impactful in recent
decades. Industrialization, advanced in technology trans-
portation, globalization, multinational corporations, and
outsourcing are all having a major impact on the interna-
tional trade system. Also, empirically, there appears to be
good evidence that international trade affects economic
growth positively by facilitating capital accumulation,
industrial structure upgrading, technological progress and
institutional advancement (Dollar 1992; Lee 1995; Maizels
1968; Wagner 2007).
Finally, in this section, another theory that is relevant to
our study is the human capital theory, which is discussed
below.
Human Capital Theory
The theory of human capital can be traced back to John
Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall, both of whom conceptu-
alized the idea of labor productivity being a result of the
capital required to develop it (Sweetland 1996). However,
it was the more recent work of Mincer (1958), Schultz
(1961), and Becker (1960, 1993), who are largely credited
with developing human capital as a field of inquiry.
Mincer (1958) developed an empirical model expressly
designed to measure the economic impacts of training. He
found that the economic gains that were sacrificed for years
invested in training were compensated with higher lifetime
earnings. Basically, he saw that time spent in training was
indeed an investment with a lifetime economic benefit.
Schultz (1961) agreed with Mincer (1958), and intro-
duced the idea that education was a form of capital. He
posed that the useful skills and knowledge acquired by
people was a form of capital and that this capital ‘‘was a
product of deliberate investment’’ (Schultz 1961). Schultz
also noted that expenditures were either consumed or
invested—which reflected the thinking of Pigou (1928),
who was the first to use the term ‘‘human capital.’’ Schultz
(1961) further extended the current thinking by posing that
a higher allocation of expenditures to investment (as
opposed to consumption) would produce a greater rate of
return. He found that ‘‘the income of the US had increased
at a higher rate than the combined amount of land, man-
hours worked, and the stock of reproducible capital used to
produce the income’’. With this, he challenged economists
to find the reason for this seeming inequality. This chal-
lenge thus became the foundation for the theory of human
capital.
Following Schultz, Becker (1960) studied the lifetime
economic benefits of a college education when compared
with a high school education. His initial work on human
capital found that ‘‘direct’’ returns did not justify increased
expenditure in education (Becker 1960). However, his later
work (Becker 1993) showed evidence to the contrary. In
1975, Becker developed the idea of separating human
capital investment into two distinct studies: (1) general
purpose human capital investment and (2) firm specific
human capital investment. The former—general purpose—
is generally applicable across the industry. It increases the
marginal productivity of the individual by increasing the
value of the individual to the industry firms. Thus the firm
paying the highest wage will thus attract the best talent.
The latter type of investment—firm specific—is not gen-
erally applicable across the industry. It increases the mar-
ginal productivity within a firm without increasing the
marginal productivity to other firms. Thus, the firm bears
the cost for specific training (Becker 1975, 1993).
Beckers’ idea of different types of training confirms the
earlier work of Mincer (1958) who presented the idea that
inter-occupational wage differentials were a result of
training (general purpose), while intra-occupational wage
differentials were a result of experience on the job (spe-
cific) (Mincer 1958).
Through the work of Mincer, Schultz and Becker, two
central themes emerged that ultimately resulted in creating
human capital as a field of inquiry: (1) that economic
growth could not be fully accounted for by conventional
economic measurement; and (2) that increased levels of
education seemed to account for increased personal income
(Sweetland 1996).
Subsequent to the foundational work, the importance of
human capital investment to national economic growth is
supported by various empirical research. The effects of
total investment in human capital are directly related to
increased GDP in developing nations (Effiok et al. 2012),
and in developed nations (Olimpia 2010). Further, empir-
ical research supports economic growth from both formal
education systems and informal training system (Galor and
Moav 2004; Glaeser et al. 2004; Lucas 1988).
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The Relationship Between Corruption and GEI
The effects of corruption on the economic activities of a
nation have received much attention in the literature.
Mauro (1996) studied the impact of host country cor-
ruption on economic growth. He found that corruption
[measured by the Business International (BI) index]
lowered private investment and thereby reduced economic
growth. He also found that corruption is strongly and
negatively correlated with the investment rate regardless
of level of ‘‘red tape’’ of the host country. He also found
that corruption lowers the profit on invested capital and
would therefore agree with Al-Sadig (2009) that corrup-
tion acts as a tax on profits.
Mauro (1997) investigated the possible causes of cor-
ruption in the public sector and followed with potential
consequences. He lists five primary regulatory causes and
two additional causes that are not associated with govern-
ment regulations. Five regulatory causes are: (1) trade
restrictions (2) government subsidies, (3) price controls, (4)
multiple exchange rate and foreign exchange allocation
schemes, and (5) low wages in the civil service. And two
non-regulatory causes are: (1) natural resource endow-
ments and (2) sociological factors.
To these causes, Mauro (1997) follows with conse-
quences that result from the corruption. In general, he finds
the following consequences in the presence of corruption:
‘‘Corruption lowers investment and retards economic
growth, talent is misallocated; reduces the effectiveness of
aid flows, governments loose tax revenue, adverse bud-
getary issues, quality of infrastructure and public services,
distorted composition of government expenditure.’’
Mauro (1997) also adds to this list of consequences
ideas about the extent to which corruption affects invest-
ment and economic growth, and provides insight into how
corruption influences governments’ spending decisions.
According to Mauro, ‘‘the amount of corruption is nega-
tively linked to the level of investment and economic
growth’’ and further ‘‘An improvement of a single standard
deviation increases investment by more than 4 % points
and the annual growth rate of per capita GDP by more than
a 0.5 %’’. Additionally, Mauro concluded that bribes can
be more readily collected on certain types of government
projects (larger over smaller) and that corruption leads to
high capital expenditures on white elephant projects.
Wei (2000) investigated the impact of corruption on the
ability of an economy to attract FDI. He found that
increasing tax on foreign MNC’s or increasing the per-
ceived level of corruption both significantly reduced
inward FDI. He also studied the impact of the US. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) on US investors. He found
that in spite of the US FCPA, US investors were no more
averse to corruption than investors in countries without a
policy against corruption in foreign economies.
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) performed an econometric
study in which they analyzed both the impact of corruption
on bilateral FDI flows, and the impact of the absolute
difference in home/host country corruption levels on for-
eign investment. Their study suggests that the level of
perceived corruption (as measured by Transparency Inter-
national’s CPI) is indeed significant and negative in regards
to bilateral FDI flows. The study also suggests that greater
absolute differences in perceived corruption levels from
home country to host country, significantly impacts the
level of bilateral investment between the two countries.
This later point suggests that the investor has gained
experience in managing the level of corruption in the home
country and is somewhat comfortable in managing the
same level of corruption in a foreign country. However,
greater levels of perceived corruption in the host country
(vis-a`-vis the home country) create an unfamiliar invest-
ment environment that negatively impacts the decision to
invest.
Voyer and Beamish (2004) conducted an econometric
study in which they analyzed nearly 30,000 Japanese
investments in 59 countries. They found that the inclusion
of a corruption index (CPI) into the model increased the
predictive power of GDP per capita—so Japanese outward
FDI is correlated with host-level corruption. Second, they
found that the type of economy is significant as a predictor
of Japanese FDI. For industrialized economies, the per-
ceived level of corruption was not significant. However the
perceived level of corruption became significant when
testing emerging economies.
Al-Sadig (2009) studied the impacts of corruption on
host country inward FDI. He found that corruption is a tax
on profits and that a 1-pt increase in the corruption level (as
measured by ICRG) reduces per capita FDI by 11–20 %.
However, he also found that the presence of quality insti-
tutions had a greater impact on inward FDI than did cor-
ruption. Therefore he concluded that a host country may
have greater perceived corruption and still attract FDI if the
quality of its institutions were perceived as high.
Given the evidence supporting the negative relationship
of corruption on foreign investment, it would seem obvious
that corruption is a hindrance to an expanding economy.
However, not all researchers concur that the relationship
between corruption and inward FDI is negative. A series of
articles suggest inconclusive evidence, and a discussion a
few articles is presented below.
Peng and Beamish (2008) for example, discussed the
inconclusive studies regarding the impact of corruption on
FDI. Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Mauro (1995, 1997),
Voyer and Beamish (2004), Wei (2000), Wu (2006); all
found that corruption had a negative impact on FDI.
However, Delios et al. (2006), Hines (1995), and Wheeler
and Mody (1992) could not confirm a negative relationship
between corruption and inward FDI. Further complicating
the study is the findings by Robertson and Watson (2004)
implying that changes in FDI may actually cause corrup-
tion. And finally, Dreher and Gassebner (2011) provide
evidence to support the ‘‘greasing the wheels’’ hypothesis,
that corruption actually has a positive effect on start-up
business when national level regulations are extreme.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1 The higher the level of perceived corruption in a
developing economy, the lower the level of GEI in that
economy.
The Relationship Between Human Capital Investment
and GEI
The relationship between human capital investment and
economic (GDP) growth is strong and widely supported in
the literature. Effiok et al. (2012) investigated the rela-
tionship between human capital investment and GDP in
Nigeria. Their study pointed out that the greater the
investment in human capital the greater the level of eco-
nomic growth (GDP). The relationship was positive and
significant. Galor and Moav (2004) compared the ability of
human capital investment to generate GDP with the ability
of physical capital investment to generate GDP. The study
was aimed at finding the impact of replacing industry with
knowledge as industrialized nations progressed through the
economic growth cycle. Their results agree with Effiok
et al. (2012) that human capital accumulation was a prime
engine of national economic growth. Using the same basic
argument, Glaeser et al. (2004) found that human capital
was more important than institutions in generating eco-
nomic growth; O’Mahony (2012) found that human capital
formation in the form of continuous learning (in addition to
formal education only), contributed significantly to a
nation’s economic growth; and Olimpia (2010) developed
a measure of the market value of human capital investment
in OECD countries, finding that while efficiency varied
across countries, investment in human capital contributed
to increased GDP growth.
Trade integration is the key to economic growth (Gra-
uwe and Zhang 2011), however, the link between human
capital investment and trade openness is less developed
than is the link between human capital investment and
GDP growth. The primary research supporting this link
was done by Contractor and Mudambi (2008). This
research investigated the role of human capital investment
in regards to the export competiveness of nations. Their
results show that human capital investment was slightly
more important to goods exports than to service exports.
Additionally, they found support for their hypothesis that
investment in human capital had a greater effect on
developing Asian countries than it did in developed
nations.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the follow-
ing hypothesis.
H2 The higher the level of human capital investment in a
developing economy, the higher the level of global eco-
nomic integration in that economy.
The Moderating Effect of Corruption
Mauro (1996) investigated the causes and effects of cor-
ruption on economic growth, foreign investment, and
government expenditures. His study focused on (1) the
causes and consequences of corruption, and (2) the rela-
tionship between corruption and government expenditure.
The study found corruption to have ‘‘considerable, adverse
effects on economic performance’’. Further, and more to
the point of this present work, that corruption is found to
lower investment and economic growth and to reduce the
share of government spending on education.
To further support his previous work, Mauro (1998)
studied the composition of government expenditure in light
of corruption. The primary research question was ‘‘whether
predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the
composition of government spending.’’ There were three
primary results: (1) corruption was found to alter the
composition of government spending by directing public
funds to those public projects, on which it was easier to
levy larger bribes and keep them secret; (2) that spending
on education was found to be adversely affected by cor-
ruption; and (3) Mauro tested the direction of causality and
found evidence to support a causal link from corruption to
reduced spending on education. Finally, the relationship
between corruption and reduced spending on education
remained consistent when testing either developed or
developing countries.
The focus of Akhter’s (2004) research is the impact of
economic globalization on human development. Addi-
tionally, he poses the relationship between economic
globalization and human development is mediated by both
economic freedom and corruption. He defines the eco-
nomic dimension of globalization as ‘‘the increasing cross-
country integration of economic systems through trade and
investments’’. He found evidence to support his hypothesis
that economic globalization is positively related to eco-
nomic freedom, which is then positively related to human
development. Additionally he finds that economic global-
ization is negatively related to corruption, which is then
negatively related to human development. Akter’s primary
finding is that economic globalization positively impacts
human development, but that this relationship is mediated
by corruption and economic freedom.
Delavallade (2006) examined the impact of corruption
on the structure of government spending by sector. Her
study found similar results to Mauro (1995, 1998) that
corruption distorts the structure of public spending by
increasing funds toward those projects that provide greater
opportunity for bribes, such as fuel and energy and defense,
and decreasing funds toward ‘‘social expenditure’’ such as
education.
Therefore, based on the above discussion, we propose
the following hypothesis.
H3 The level of perceived corruption in a developing
economy will have a moderating effect on the relationship
between human capital investment and the level of global
economic integration in that economy.
Methodology
For this study, we are primarily interested in examining
emerging and developing economies, and note that we
collectively refer to these as developing countries. As such,
we use the United Nation designations for these categories
of countries (United Nations Statistical Division 2012).
According to the United Nations, there exists ‘‘no estab-
lished convention for the designation of ‘‘developed’’ and
‘‘developing’’ countries or areas in the United Nations
system.’’ Further from the U.N. ‘‘The designations
‘‘developed’’ and developing’’ are intended for statistical
convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment
about the stage reached by a particular country or area in
the development process’’.
To test research hypotheses, we gathered data from
several sources. All data are averaged over the 6-year
period from 2005 to 2010. Following the reasoning from
Voyer and Beamish (2004), taking the average over several
years tends to account for fluctuations in the yearly data
and reduces potential impacts of single year abnormalities.
For this study, we excluded those developing countries
with incomplete data, resulting in a sample size of 60
countries (see Appendix).
Measurement of the Variables
In our study, we use GEI as the primary dependent vari-
able, against which we regress the independent variables:
(1) human capital and (2) corruption, (3) human_capi-
tal 9 corruption, and (4) control variables (unemployment,
labor growth rate, population (log), GDP/Capita, govern-
ment consumption as a percentage of GDP, economic
freedom (i.e., open markets, limited government, regula-
tory efficiency), and regions (i.e., East Asia and Pacific,
Europe and Central Asia, Central America and Latin
America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa)).
Research Variables
We use GEI as our dependent variable. To operationalize
the construct of GEI, we relied on the work of, for exam-
ple, Julius (1990), Akhter (2004) and Rugman and Verbeke
(2004) who recommend the use of both exports and FDI to
measure economic globalization. In this study we used a
6-year average (2005–2010) for both exports of goods and
services per capita and for inward FDI per capita. When
factor analysis was performed on these two variables, both
of these variables loaded on a single factor with eigenvalue
great than 1. This factor was labeled as GEI.
Independent Variables
Human Capital Investment
Based on the existing research on human capital investment
and the impact on economic growth, we measure human
capital using both the level of education and government
spending on education (Contractor and Mudambi 2008). To
reflect the level of education, we utilize the education index
(EI) produced as part of the human development index (HDI)
from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).We
use the 6-year average (2005–2010). To reflect the level of
government spending on education, we use government
spending on education as a percent of total government
spending. These data were obtained from theWorld Bank and
averaged over the 6-year period (2005–2010 inclusive). By
using the 6-year average for both variables, we remove the
impact of single year abnormalities and create a variablemore
indicative of a county’s investment in human capital.We used
factor analysis on two variables to create a multidimensional
construct to reflect human capital investment. Factor analysis
produced a single factor with eigenvalue greater than 1. We
labeled this factor as human capital investment.
Corruption
In this study, data for measuring corruption were gathered
from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index (CPI). The CPI index is one of the most widely
known and widely used measures of perceived national
corruption (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Voyer and Beam-
ish 2004; Wilhelm 2002). The CPI index ranges from 0
(zero) to 10 (ten), with 10 indicating the lowest levels of
corruption (or highly transparent country) and 0 indicating
the highest levels of corruption (or least transparent
country). In the current study, the CPI index represents the
6-year (2005–2010) average. This approach is supported by
previous studies (Brouthers et al. 2008; Habib and Zu-
rawicki 2002; Voyer and Beamish 2004).
Control Variables
Labor Growth Rate
We follow (Peng and Beamish 2008) in controlling for the
growth in labor availability as research has shown that as
the availability of cost-effective labor decreases, labor
costs increase. Thus, a key factor in attracting resource-
seeking FDI is the availability of competitive labor (Bart-
lett and Ghoshal 1988; Brouthers et al. 2008).
Unemployment
We control for the unemployment rate. Research indicates
that FDI stimulates employment at a national level by both
MNE’s and SME’s (Billington 1999; Habib and Zurawicki
2002; Peng and Beamish 2008). Further empirical evidence
suggests that lifelong learning provides a shield against
unemployment (Badea and Rogojanu 2012).
Population
Regarding labor availability, a nation’s population is also a
factor in attracting investment. We thus follow (Arregle
et al. 2013; Vaaler et al. 2008) in controlling for national
level population.
Regions
In an examination of MNE investment, Rugman and Ver-
beke found that most MNE’s are regional rather than truly
global (Rugman and Verbeke 2004, 2008; Rugman 2001).
Additionally, Arregle, Miller, Hitt, and Beamish reveal
evidence that regional institutions have a significant influ-
ence on the country and region selection for MNE invest-
ment (Arregle et al. 2013). Using dummy variables
corresponding to the regions identified by the World Bank,
we control for East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central
Asia, Central and Latin America, Middle East and North
Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
GDP per Capita
We followed Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Peng and
Beamish (2008) research in controlling for GDP, which has
been shown to be an important explanatory variable in
determining the amount of inward FDI (Grosse and Trev-
ino 1995; Kobrin 1976; Wells and Wint 2000).
Government Consumption as a Percentage of GDP
We control for host government consumption following
Voyer and Beamish (2004), who indicated that market
seeking FDI may be influenced by the degree of govern-
ment consumption. Additionally, studies have indicated
that the degree of inward FDI can be influenced by the size
of the host governments’ economy (Kobrin 1976; Brou-
thers et al. 2008).
Economic Freedom
We control for economic freedom since the level of eco-
nomic freedom has been found to be a contributing factor
for both economic growth (Webster 2012) and inward FDI
(Pearson et al. 2012). While several indices of economic
freedom exist, we relied on economic freedom data from
the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
However, while a single aggregate index of economic
freedom has been used empirically in many studies as a
measure of economic freedom in a nation, recent studies
reveal that a single aggregate index may not be appropriate
for operationalizing the measure (Ayal and Karras 1998;
Carlsson and Lundstro¨m 2002; Haan and Siermann 1998).
Thus for our study, we sought to remove the concerns
associated with using a single aggregate variable. After
removing freedom-from-corruption from the list of 10
economic variables gathered form the Heritage Foundation,
we ran exploratory factor analysis to determine sub-indices
for the remaining nine variables. We control for economic
freedom by grouping the remaining nine variables into the
three categories indicated by exploratory factor analysis.
These three sub-indices are: (a) open markets comprised
trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom;
(b) limited government comprised fiscal freedom and
government spending; and (c) regulatory efficiency com-
prised business freedom, labor freedom, monetary free-
dom, and property rights freedom. This is consistent with
the methodology used by the Heritage Foundation.
Analysis and Results
Analysis was conducted in a 2-stage process. The first stage
consisted of correlation analysis (see Table 1) to identify
and remove any variables that could cause problems with
multicollinearity. In the second stage, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) linear regression technique was employed.
Here the dependent variable (GEI) was regressed against
the primary independent variables (CPI, human capital
investment, as well as a moderator variable human capital
investment 9 CPI) and the control all of variables as dis-
cussed above.
Additionally, following Voyer and Beamish (2004), we
tested for multicollinearity by examining the Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable. It is generally
agreed that a VIF coefficient greater than 10 is indicative of
severe multicolinearity (Hair 2010; Kennedy 2008; Kutner
2004). However, more stringent standards establish that a
VIF level above 5 indicates severe multicollinearity. For
our analysis, no single VIF is greater than 3.5. Finally,
Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007) provided evidence that
correlations above 0.70 could indicate issues with multi-
colinearity. We do not have any correlations above 0.70
between any of our independent or control variables. Hence
we do not have any indication of severe multicollinearity.
To test our hypotheses, OLS regression tests were
employed in a hierarchical manner in the following way:
(1) the control variables only, (2) the full model with all
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predictor variables, and (3) the full model with a moderator
term.
The first model (Model 1) included only control vari-
ables: unemployment, labor growth rate, population (log),
the regional dummy variables (East Asia and Pacific,
Europe and central Asia, Caribbean and Latin America,
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan-Africa),
GDP/capita, government consumption (% GDP), economic
freedom (openmarkets), economic freedom (limited gov-
ernment), and economic freedom (regulatory efficiency).
Results from Model 1 (see Table 2) indicate that these
control variables alone showed some explanatory power
when considered as a group of indicator variables:
R2 = 0.88 and adjusted R2 = 0.85, F = 29.90,
p =\0.0001. In this model, population (log), GDP/Capita,
the Sub-Sah-Africa region, and economic freedom (lim-
gov) were significant.
The second model (Model 2) included all of the control
variables from Model 1 and the two independent variables:
CPI and human capital Investment. Results from Model 2
(see Table 2) indicate that the addition of the independent
variables increased the overall significance of the model:
R2 = 0.93 and adjusted R2 = 0.91, F = 45.77,
p =\0.0001. In this model, both the independent variables
(CPI and Human Capital Investment) were strongly sig-
nificant at the 0.001 and 0.01 level respectively.
The final model (Model 3) consisted of all of the vari-
ables from Model 2 and the moderator term (human_cap-
ital investment 9 CPI). Results from this model (see
Table 2) are: R2 = 0.94, and adjusted R2 = 0.92,
F = 46.48, p =\0.0001. Also, both of the independent
variables (human capital investment and CPI) as well as the
moderator term (human_capital investment 9 CPI) were
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.05 respectively.
We posited in H1 that corruption is negatively related to
GEI in developing countries. Additionally, we posited in H2
that for developing economies, the higher the level of human
capital investment, the greater the degree of GEI. Examining
the results from Model 3, the standardized b coefficient for
CPI inwas 0.40 and p =\0.0001. ThusH1 is supported. The
standardized b coefficient for human capital investment is
0.57 and p =\0.05. Thus H2 is supported. Based on these
results, there is evidence to indicate that country level cor-
ruption (as measured by the CPI index) and human capital
investment are significant predictors of GEI. Thus we find
strong support for both H1 and H2.
In H3, we posited that for developing countries, the level
of corruption would have a moderating impact on the
Table 2 Linear regression
model(s)
t-stats in parenthesis
All bs except constant, are
standardized
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.001;
*** p\ 0.0001
Model 1
Control variables
Model 2
Complete model
Model 3
Moderating effects
Controls
Unemployment 0.05 (0.77) -0.02 (-0.41) -0.03 (-0.61)
Labor growth rate -0.06 (-1.08) -0.09* (-2.18) -0.08* (-2.06)
Population (log) -0.30*** (-5.32) -0.23*** (-5.12) -0.23*** (-5.28)
Eu_Cen_Asia 0.04 (0.49) -0.02 (-0.30) 0.01 (0.22)
CALA 0.001 (-0.11) -0.10 (-1.71) -0.10 (-1.67)
MENA -0.09 (-1.29) -0.07 (-1.35) -0.07 (-1.30)
Sub_Sah_Africa -0.18* (-2.37) -0.21* (-3.39) -0.19* (-3.19)
GDP per capita 0.75*** (13.09) 0.58*** (11.17) 0.59*** (11.74)
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.03 (-0.40) -0.02 (-0.31) -0.03 (-0.67)
Economic freedom (open markets) -0.10 (-1.32) -0.14* (-2.40) -0.13* (-3.32)
Economic freedom (limited gov) -0.20** (-3.49) -0.09 (-1.77) -0.11* (-2.29)
Economic freedom (regulatory eff) 0.07 (0.95) -0.09 (-1.37) -0.07 (-1.15)
Independent variables
CPI 0.33*** (4.79) 0.40*** (5.42)
Human capital investment 0.21** (3.46) 0.57* (3.23)
HC 9 CPI -0.42* (-2.15)
Constant 3.14** (4.02) 2.39** (3.78) 2.28** (3.74)
Model indices
R2 0.88 0.93 0.94
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.91 0.92
Model F value 29.90 45.77 46.48
Significance (p) \0.0001 \0.0001 \0.0001
Sample size 60 60 60
relationship between human capital investment and GEI. In
our model, the moderator variable (human_capital invest-
ment 9 CPI) was indeed found to have a significant impact
on the relationship between human capital investment and
GEI. The standardized b coefficient for the moderator
variable was -0.42 and p =\0.05. Thus we find strong
support for H3.
Discussion and Implications
Extant literature on economic growth has investigated
many macroeconomic variables (FDI, GDP, national trade
among them), and their respective implications for the
national economy. However, as noted by (Julius 1990)
single unit indicators of a national economy tend to miss
the complex nature inherent within. We have attempted to
fill this gap in the literature by introducing and investi-
gating the GEI construct. As we have noted in this study,
the GEI construct is a multidimensional construct devel-
oped to reflect the dynamic and complex nature of national
level economic activity.
The findings of the study offer several insights into both
the determinants of GEI, and the impact of national level
corruption on GEI. First, we find evidence that GEI com-
prised mainly from exports of goods and services, and
inward FDI. This is a strong indicator of national economic
growth. Second, we find evidence that increased national
level corruption has a negative direct impact on a country’s
GEI and thus, on economic growth. Third, we find that
greater investments in human capital have a positive
impact on a nation’s GEI. Thus, we find support for all
three of our hypotheses. Additionally, we find strong evi-
dence that corruption significantly moderates the relation-
ship between human capital investment and a nations GEI.
Thus, the positive impact of an investment in human cap-
ital is somewhat dampened by national level corruption.
The findings of our study support the argument made
Voyer and Beamish (2004), who note that corruption is a
cancer which affects all aspects of society (e.g., human
capital development) and significantly debilitate a cadre of
business and economic activities.
As noted by Schultz (1961), Becker (1960, 1975, 1993)
and Mincer (1958), human capital investment is widely
regarded as an antecedent to increased national economic
activity. We empirically find support for this assertion.
Also, while some researchers have noted the positive side
of doing business in a corrupt economy (Dreher and Gas-
sebner 2011), our research indicates negative direct effects
of corruption on national economic activity. Finally, and of
primary importance to this work, we have empirically
tested the moderating effect of national level corruption on
the relationship between human capital investment and
GEI. Our work provides evidence that in developing
economies, corruption significantly moderates the invest-
ment in human capital—effectively removing some of the
economic benefit of the investment.
Implications
The findings of this research as discussed above, not only
can help in better understanding the role of corruption and
human capital investment in explaining the GEI of devel-
oping economies, but also provide practical implications
for leaders and policy makers of these economies. An
important outcome of economic interdependence and
cross-border relationships—through inward FDI and
international trade, for example, has been the greater
attention paid to the manner in which nations pursue their
economic, political and social affairs. This has brought to
light corrupt business practices prevalent within many
economies, especially developing economies. We agree
with Akc¸ay (2006) who notes that ‘‘Corruption is a
symptom of deep institutional weaknesses and leads to
inefficient economic, social, and political outcomes. It
reduces economic growth, retards long-term foreign and
domestic investments, enhances inflation, depreciates
national currency, reduces expenditures for education’’.
Thus our work supports the overwhelming view of
researchers that corruption in any form is treated as a
disease that causes many social and economic ills and it
damages the moral and ethical fibers of the society.
Corruption leads to the misallocation and inefficient use
of resources, private sector development, and weakens
institutions (e.g., educational institutions) that are neces-
sary for attracting FDI and engaging in international trade
activities. For developing countries to achieve greater
economic interdependence, it is imperative for government
leaders to develop policies that reduce corrupt practices
and encourage investment in human capital development.
Evidence indicates that a country with a high level of
transparency in government (that is low corruption) expe-
riences strong economic growth, more inward FDI, and
more spending on such areas as improving educational
institutions, training, etc. In fact, extant literature indicates
that a country cannot achieve any meaningful economic
growth without adequate investment in human capital via
education and training.
Human capital investment is the catalyst of development
for a developing country and the policy makers should lay
high emphasis for the development of its human capital.
Education and literacy are key components of United
Nations Human Development Index. Investment in edu-
cation and increasing literacy, are considered indispensable
tools for transforming developing populations into pro-
ductive populations (e.g., human capital) as well as for
creating awareness among the masses about the various ills
of society including the menace of high corruption.
In brief, the quality of institutions such as educational
institutions and government spending on education seem to be
primary factors for the economic growth of a country. Eco-
nomic growth and a higher standard of living is possible when
corrupt government practices are reduced and institutions
such as the education system are strengthened through trans-
parent policy making. But if the institutions are incapable of
effectively enforcing policy reforms for the betterment of the
society, corruption will hasten economic demise.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was threefold: (1) to establish
GEI as a multidimensional construct comprised national
export of goods and services, and inward FDI; (2) to
examine the relationships between human capital invest-
ment, corruption, and GEI; and (3) to empirically study the
moderating effect of national level corruption on the rela-
tionship between human capital investment and GEI.
In support of the first objective, we agree with Julius
(1990), who stated that single unit indicators of a national
economy tend to miss the complex nature of the overall
economy. To address this oversimplification, we have
introduced and tested the GEI construct to more accurately
capture the complexity of an economic environment. Our
results find empirical support for the idea that complex
economic growth in developing countries can be partially
captured by including the impact of both inward FDI and
outward exports of gods and services. By establishing this
construct, we have extended the existing literature by
demonstrating the complex nature of a growing economy is
accurately captured by a single latent construct. This
finding sets the stage for more complex future research on
economic growth determinants by accounting for more
than just a single factor indicator (such as GDP) in
reflecting economic growth.
In supporting objectives 2 and 3, this work finds that
GEI is positively impacted by increased investment in
human capital. Thus, our work provides additional support
for the work of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), Becker
(1960, 1975, 1993) and more recently by Effiok et al.
(2012), that investment in human capital has a positive and
significant effect on national economic growth.
Another important contribution of our the current
research is that the pay-off for increasing investment in
human capital can be significantly reduced by the level of
corruption active in the public sector. Thus, a nation that
adheres to human capital theory and invests heavily in
developing a greater level of education can simultaneously
offset the potential economic returns by permitting high
levels of corruption. On the other hand, by reducing public
sector corruption a country can effectively increase the
efficiency of its investment in public education to produce
increases in economic growth.
Finally building on strong theory and empirical studies,
the results of this work have provided detailed, broad
ranging implications for policy makers in developing
nations. Primarily that by reducing public sector corruption
developing countries can potentially increase the economic
multiplier effect of investment in human capital.
Appendix: Developing Countries Used in the Study
Algeria Lithuania
Argentina Madagascar
Armenia Malaysia
Barbados Mauritius
Belize Mexico
Botswana Moldova
Brazil Mongolia
Bulgaria Morocco
Burkina Faso Namibia
Cambodia Paraguay
Cameroon Peru
Chile Philippines
Colombia Poland
Costa Rica Romania
Dominican Republic Russian Federation
Egypt, Arab Rep. Saudi Arabia
El Salvador Senegal
Ethiopia Serbia
Georgia Seychelles
Ghana St. Lucia
Hungary Syrian Arab Republic
Indonesia Tanzania
Jamaica Thailand
Kuwait Tunisia
Kyrgyz Republic Uganda
Lao PDR Ukraine
Latvia Uruguay
Lebanon Vanuatu
Lesotho Vietnam
Liberia Yemen, Rep.
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